With this paper we seek to contribute to the literature on the relation betweennance and growth. We argue that most studies in the eld fail to measure the quality of nancial intermediation but rather resort to using proxies on the size of nancial systems. Moreover, cross-country comparisons suer from the disadvantage that systematic dierences between markedly dierent economies may drive the result that nance matters. To circumvent these two problems we examine the importance of the quality of banks' nancial intermediation in the regions of one economy only: Germany. To approximate the quality of nancial intermediation we use cost eciency estimates derived with stochastic frontier analysis. We nd that the quantity of supplied credit is indeed insignicant when a measure of intermediation quality is included. In turn, the eciency of intermediation is robust, also after excluding banks likely to operate in multiple regions and distinguishing between dierent banking pillars active in Germany.
The notion that a sound nancial system fosters economic growth has already been advocated by Schumpeter (1934 Schumpeter ( , 1939 . Since the seminal empirical work by King and Levine (1993) , the question if and to what extent nancial development spurs economic growth experienced a renaissance. Numerous studies test Schumpeter's early hypotheses. 2 Given the available evidence, only few economists doubt that nance matters for growth today. But in our view most studies suer from two major shortcomings. First, in a Schumpeterian world it is the qulity rather than the quntity of nancial intermediation that inuences economic growth. However, most studies specify proxies of nancial systems' size, for example the credit to GDP ratio. Second, most studies are of a cross-country nature, frequently sampling very dierent economies like the U.S. on the one hand and Thailand on the other. Then, signicant nancial indicators may partly be driven by excessively heterogeneous samples. 3 We address these problems in the following manner. First, we grasp the quality of intermediation by using microeconomic technical eciency measures derived at the bank-level to assess banks' abilities to convert inputs into nancial products and services. Second, we seek to reduce potential sample bias by focusing on the regions of one industrialized country only, namely Germany. Thereby, we ensure that many environmental factors identied as signicant are fairly homogeneous in our sample. We hypothesize that in Germany's fragmented three-pillar system of private and public banks the quality of nancial intermediation is not only dierent 1 m.koetter@rug.nl (M. Koetter) and michael.wedow@bundesbank.de (M. Wedow). This paper represents the authors' personal opinions and does not reect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We are grateful to participants of the research center's seminar series at the Deutsche Bundesbank, in particular Julia von Borstel, Jörg Döpke, Hannah S. Hempell, Heinz Herrmann, Frank Heid, Thilo Liebig, Fred Ramb and Stéphanie Stolz, for most valuable input. The feedback of our colleagues Jaap Bos, Jörg Breitung, Claudia Buch, Jim Kolari, Clemens Kool, Thorsten Nessi Nestmann, Steven Ongena, Katharina Raabe and Beatrice Weder di Mauro has also been of utmost help to us, too. Furthermore, we are indebted to seminar participants at the XIV Tor Vergata Conference on Banking and Finance, especially Ifthekar Hassan and Paul Wachtel. Comments by the Research Council of the Deutsche Bundesbank, in particular those of Bronwyn Hall and Martin Hellwig have been most helpful to us. Finally, we would like to thank seminar participants of the GBSA workshop held at the University of Frankfurt and the Institute of Economics & Econometrics Seminar series at the University of Groningen. The feedback received from Franklin Allen, Andreas Hackethal, Jan Jacobs, Robert Lensink and Jan Pieter Krahnen is highly appreciated. All remaining errors are, of course, our own.
2 For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Beck and Levine (2002) and Berger et al. (2004) . Review studies are Levine (2004) , Thiel (2001) and Dolar and Meh (2001) .
3 To some extent this is merely an omitted variable bias if factors inuencing growth are not controlled for. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) show that the legal system and Garretsen et al. (2004) that cultural dierences inuence growth. However, beyond this potential omitted variable problem we may also face the conceptual problem entailed in the assumption of a homogeneous production function between, say, developed and less developed countries. across regions but also of signicant importance to promote growth. 4 Our study adds to the only two analyses that we are aware of that also seek to distinguish between the quality and the quantity of nancial intermediation, namely Lucchetti et al. (2001) and Berger et al. (2004) .
In this paper, we concentrate throughout on banks only. We do not investigate the relative merits of banks versus markets or other intermediaries for two reasons. First, increasingly many scholars discard the view that banks and markets are substitutes (Merton and Bodie, 2004) . Empirical evidence indicates that both markets and institutions are integral parts of a nancial system that complement each other (Levine, 2002; Beck and Levine, 2002) . Second, Germany is a role-model of a bankbased system. Koetter et al. (2004) and Hackethal (2004) examine inasmuch the German economy depends on banks, markets and other intermediaries to channel funds from savers to investors. Their results conrm conventional wisdom: German banks were, still are and likely remain to be of paramount importance in Germany's nancial system for the foreseeable future.
We structure the paper as follows. In section 2, we discuss the literature that links nance and growth theoretically and empirically. In section 3, we introduce our growth specication, the methodology to derive the quality of nancial intermediation by banks and the data used. In section 4 we present and discuss our results. We conclude in section 5.
Financial Development and Growth
The question if and how nancial development inuences real economic growth is at the very heart of the nance-growth literature. Both the available evidence and remaining open issues are numerous and have been reviewed by Levine (2004) recently. Here, we focus on two issues. The link between nance and growth on the one hand and the available empirical evidence on the other.
Theoretical Considerations
The importance of nance for real economic growth is not without debate. On the one hand, Robinson (1952) argues that nancial services are provided as a reaction to the demand by corporate rms. In her view, nance follows entrepreneurial activity.
5 Similarly, Lucas (1988) regards nance an overvalued explanatory factor in growth theory. On the other hand, economists like Gurley and Shaw (1955) , Gerschenkron (1963) , Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973) nd that neglecting nancial development severely limits our understanding of economic growth.
Along the lines of the latter scholars there are two channels through which nancial development can inuence growth. The rst is Hicksian in nature and emphasizes the enhanced accumulation of capital through higher savings (Hicks, 1969) . The second represents a Schumpetrian point of view and centers on the improved ability of the nancial sector to increase technological progress through an ecient selection, funding and monitoring of projects (Schumpeter, 1934 (Schumpeter, , 1939 .
We use a simplistic growth model in the vein of Pagano (1993) to illustrate these eects: the AK-model. 6 Y t denotes aggregate output at time t, which is generated with one production factor only, namely capital K t .
7 A is a positive constant that reects the current level of technology. The production function is
Here, the marginal product of capital equals total factor productivity A. Output can only be consumed or saved so that Y = C + S. We assume that the capital stock depreciates at a constant rate δ. Investment equals the dierence in capital stocks in two subsequent periods, K t and K t+1 :
We assume next that the nancial goods market is in equilibrium so that aggregate savings S equal aggregate investment I.
The factor η is 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 and captures the ability of the nancial sector to intermediate funds. Only a fraction of savings is converted into investments because we assume that frictions exist when channelling funds from surplus to decit units. High values of η indicate that only little resources are wasted.
From equation (1) we know that the growth rate of output g =
Y t+1
Yt − 1 depends on the development of K. In the steady state, both capital and output grow at the same rate. Rewriting the investment expression in equation (2) yields:
Rearranging terms and noting that
− 1 holds in the steady state, we suppress subscripts and write the growth rate g as:
Equation (5) illustrates how nancial development can inuence growth: via a larger fraction of income that is saved, s; via enhancing total factor productivity, A; and via an improved quality of intermediation, η, by reducing the fraction of savings "lost in transition". The former eect relates more to the Hicksian view that better developed nancial systems are those that channel higher quantities from savers 6 The AK model can easily be extended e.g. for multiple production factors or population growth. For our illustrative purposes we prefer here a model as simple as possible. 7 Here, K represents capital in a broad sense and also augments human capital (Chapter 4, Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) ). 8 Note that this reects the assumption of a small, closed economy.
to investors. In contrast, the latter two eects resemble the Schumpetrian train of thought. Better intermediaries help to reduce slack in the nancial system and foster capital productivity through investing in more protable projects.
The Hicksian as well as the Schumpeterian notion entail that better developed nancial systems imply lower transaction and information costs. Levine (2004) distinguishes ve ways how banks accomplish these reductions: 9 (i) information collection, (ii) project monitoring, (iii) risk management, (iv) channelling savings and (v) facilitate transactions of goods and services.
First, consider information collection. If it is costly to gather information when making investment decisions, studies in the vein of Allen (1990) show that nancial intermediaries help to economize on search cost and thereby foster aggregate saving. According to Morales (2003) , information gathering leads to learning eects. This implies that nancial intermediaries are better suited to spot entrepreneurs with the highest potential to innovate on products, services and processes.
Second, consider monitoring. Better developed nancial systems aid equity and debt holders of rms to scrutinize managers as to ensure that the latter act in the best interest of the former. If information asymmetries exist, managers may exploit free-rider considerations of investors in nancial markets when individual investors rely on each other to conduct costly monitoring activities. 10 The seminal model by Diamond (1984) illuminates how banks act as delegated monitors on behalf of investors, thereby solving the free-rider problem. De la Fuente and Marin (1996) nd that banks help to enhance productivity as they are particularly suited to monitor opaque, and hence information cost intensive, innovative projects. In the vein of Schumpeter's constructive destruction argument, Bencivenga and Smith (1993) provide a model where banks ration credit in order to select the most protable investments, which raises capital productivity.
Third, consider risk management. Better developed nancial systems help savers and investors in three ways to enhance risk management: cross-sectional diversication, intertemporal diversication, and liquidity provision. The rst issue follows straight from nance theory. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argue that intermediaries foster productivity thanks to their ability to select protable investments and to assemble portfolios that ameliorate project-specic shocks. While it may be too costly for an individual investor to diversify, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show how intermediaries facilitate the funding of more risky but innovative projects. The second issue highlights intertemporal risk-sharing (Allen and Gale, 1997) . Especially in Germany's corporate culture of long-term relations between borrowers, lenders and owners (Elsas and Krahnen, 2004) nancial intermediaries may commit to a long-run perspective and help both savers and investors to prevent premature divesture. The third issue refers to liquidity risk. The more diculties savers have to convert real assets into means of exchange, the less inclined they are to give up the direct control of their savings. This implies that either nancial markets (Bencivenga et al., 1995) , intermediaries (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) or a mixture of the two (Fecht et al., 2005) can help to insure savers against liquidity shocks, thereby fostering investment in longer-run, illiquid and relatively risky projects.
Fourth, consider the collection and channelling of savings. Many projects require large, indivisible funding. Collecting funds from a multitude of investors is expensive for an individual project owner. Financial intermediaries can spread these xed costs if they execute this collection function for many savers and investors (Sirri and Tufano, 1995) . This increases aggregate savings and investment by matching dierent denominations between the two.
Fifth, consider the facilitation of exchanging goods and services. Financial development helps to establish an accepted medium of exchange. This reduces transaction and information costs since these are high if non-standardized goods have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in barter economies. According to Greenwood and Smith (1996) , this allows for a higher number of transactions, which is necessary if an economy increasingly specializes. They argue that higher specialization favors productivity gains and thereby promotes growth.
In sum, all ve functions of nancial intermediaries aect growth via the volume of savings and the allocation of capital to productive investments. Additionally, we introduced a factor η which captures the amount of savings that is lost during the intermediation process. We regard the former eect primarily as a quantity eect that nancial development has on growth. In contrast, we regard the latter two eects as a joint quality eect of the sector's ability to channel nancial resources eciently to those investment projects that maximize return. Let us turn next to the empirical evidence as how to measure nancial development.
Empirical Evidence
Empirical analyses in the growth literature rarely specify the AK model used previously to illustrate the relation between nance and growth. Most studies analyze if and how fast per capita income y converges to its steady state. Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) show that the average growth rate of per capita output depends on the initial level of per capita output, Y 0 .
11 On this basis, Lucchetti et al. (2001) denote what they call the reference model of the nance-growth literature as
where lower case letters indicate the log of a variable, F D denotes a proxy of nancial development, x is a vector of additional control variables and is a random error term. In equation (6), ∆y depicts the growth rate of per capita GDP. To our knowledge none of the studies on Germany's economic growth considers the nancial sector in the analysis (Niebuhr, 2001; Dreger and Kosfeld, 2003; Kosfeld et al., 2005) . This neglect is surprising because, to put it in terms of Levine (2004) , the evidence in support of a positive relation between nancial development and growth is remarkably robust across a whole range of alternative empirical methodologies.
11 See the discussion in chapters 11 and 12, in particular their equation (11.1).
With respect to the international evidence, the seminal contribution in the nance-growth literature is King and Levine (1993) . Their empirical specication of the growth model is based on a single cross-sectional analysis under the assumption of identical aggregate production functions as depicted in equation (6). Their proxy for nancial development F D equals liquid liabilities of the nancial industry relative to gross domestic product (GDP).
12 Hence, King and Levine (1993) gauge primarily the quantity eect of nancial development. Additionally, they acknowledge the importance of human capital accumulation, population growth, trade or government expenditure and specify according covariates to enter x. For 77 countries during the period 1960 and 1989 and three alternative measures of economic growth 13 they nd signicant and large relations between nancial development and growth.
Many empirical studies of the growth-nance nexus (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Da Rin and Hellmann, 2002) proxy F D by a variation of these initially suggested measures. Levine et al. (2000) extend earlier analyses regarding estimation techniques and data coverage. Their results conrm earlier ndings: a signicant and strong inuence of nancial development on growth. They conclude that the evidence on the importance of nance for growth is robust.
The available evidence is criticized by Lucchetti et al. (2001) primarily for the choice of proxies of nancial development. They stress two issues. First, the volume of credit intermediated is only an indirect measure of the Schumpeter argument that better developed nancial systems enjoy less frictions in the intermediation process and foster additionally the rate of return through better project selection and monitoring. Secondly, absolute measures of credit volume are subject to simultaneity problems, initially pointed out by Robinson (1952) , to a much larger extent than a relative measure of the quality with which banks perform their intermediation task. In a nutshell, credit volume may simply be positively correlated with growth because in an expanding economy rms increase their demand for nancial funds. Lucchetti et al. (2001) nd indeed that both the quantity of credit and the quality of banks as measured by cost eciency have signicant inuence on regional growth, respectively. The only additional study that we are aware of that also distinguishes more explicitly between the quantity and quality eect of nancial development is Berger et al. (2004) . For a sample of 49 nations they do nd a positive and significantly dierent eect of bank eciency on growth during 1993 and 2000. In sum, both studies suggest that the alternative channels as to how nancial development matters for growth should be separated: quantity versus quality.
A second critique of most international evidence is related to the cross-country nature of these studies. Failure to account for systematic dierences across countries leads to biased results. Intuitively, comparing growth rates and the volume of cumulative loans to GDP between developed and less-developed countries may yield spurious results (Rioja and Valev, 2004) . While the identication of additional control variables is an important progress in the nance-growth literature, an alternative strategy is to compare regions with reasonably akin economic structures.
One of the few studies embarking on this train of thought is Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) . They examine the relation between branching deregulation in the U.S. and its impact on state growth. They nd that deregulation improved the quality of lending, measured by individual banks' shares of non-performing loans, thereby fostering capital accumulation. With regard to European evidence we are only aware of Italian studies. Besides Lucchetti et al. (2001) , Guiso and Zingales (2002) use survey data on loan applicants' success to receive a loan as a proxy for nancial development. They nd that higher nancial development fosters entrepreneurial activity, enhances competition in the non-nancial sector and results in higher corporate growth. These studies suggest that after eliminating a range of reasons for systematic dierences between regions it is the quality of nancial intermediation that spurs growth.
In sum, theory suggests that well-developed banks should spur growth via a quantity and a quality eect. However, the empirical literature did not yet address the issue as how to measure these two dierent channels more directly. We turn next to our methodology as how to measure regional growth in Germany.
Methodology
Our primary concern in this paper is perfectly in line with one agenda point for future research in Levine (2004) : The necessity to develop better proxies for nancial development. We begin with our specication of a growth model and subsequently discuss the measurement of bank eciency as a proxy for intermediation quality.
Growth Specication
A crucial assumption of cross-sectional growth studies in the vein of equation (6) is that production functions are supposed to be homogeneous across analyzed regions. In our view, it is most likely that such an assumption is overly heroic due to unobserved country-specic eects.
14 While using alternative samples of more homogeneous regions within one country partly alleviates the problem, Islam (1995) suggests to approach the problem more directly. He advocates the use of panel estimators to relax the restrictive assumption of homogeneous production functions across regions. This approach avoids the bias of estimated coecients when omitting unobservable region-specic eects if these are correlated with the error. Furthermore, Levine (2004) notes that cross-sectional estimation of mean growth rates neglects the information contained in the time variation and forgoes additional degrees of freedom, which are available when exploiting longitudinal data. Therefore, we use in this study panel data and estimation techniques.
Another decisive advantage of a panel approach relates to potential simultaneity problems of nancial development indicators and growth. The use of endogenous regressors leads to estimations that suer from inconsistency and bias, which requires the specication of suited instrument variables. Levine et al. (2000) stress that panel data enables us to control for endogenous explanatory variables insofar as dynamic panel data estimators in the vein of Arellano and Bond (1991) have been developed to address the potential simultaneity bias directly. They exploit the information contained in panel data by choosing lagged level variables as instruments as to solve the issue. Moreover, they allow us to explicitly test the validity of chosen instruments.
We follow Islam (1995) and Levine et al. (2000) and specify the reduced form of a growth model in levels as a dynamic panel model. The regression equation is:
As previously, all variables in lower cases are denoted in logarithms. We amend time indicators t and in addition, F D contains now two measures: the volume F D V and the quality of nancial development F D Q . The former resembles the well-known specication of bank credit volume relative to GDP in the nance-growth literature. We deal with the measurement of the latter below in section 3.2. We specify a vector of further control variables, x, to contain human capital HC and the growth rate of the working population ET G. µ i is an unobserved region-specic eect and represents the error term, where the latter is i,t ∼ iid(0, σ 2 ), independent of each other and among themselves. Equation (7) cannot be estimated directly because the lagged endogenous variable is correlated with the unobserved group eects µ i . Thus, we have to eliminate the latter. To this end the Arellano-Bond estimator transforms equation (7) by taking rst dierences to yield:
The implementation of equation (8) is not straightforward because the dierenced error term and lagged dependent variable, E[∆y i,t−1 , ∆ i,t ] = 0, are now correlated by construction. Under the assumption that the i,t are not autocorrelated, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest to employ lagged levels as instruments for ∆y i,t−1 . The Arellano-Bond estimator is formulated as a GMM estimator with the moment conditions given by
where W i denotes a matrix of instruments. If the lagged dierence of the dependent variable can be instrumented sensibly with its own lagged levels, equation (9) holds and we can reject the presence of a correlation between dierenced error terms and instruments.
In addition to the correlation problem of y i,t prevalent by construction of the dierence estimator, we have to address the concern that our explanatory variables F D V and F D Q are potentially also correlated with the error due to reverse causality. In principle, any measure of nancial development is potentially endogeneous.
Especially
16
The appropriateness of the chosen instruments can be validated by a test on the validity of the moment restrictions. The Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions represents such a test on the moment conditions formulated in equation (9) with the null-hypothesis H 0 that moment conditions are not systematically violated.
Specifying nancial development as exogenous, predetermined or endogenous variables and using alternative instruments respectively, allows us to test which choice of instruments for nancial development is appropriate.
17 Let us turn beforehand to our approach to measure the quality eect of nancial development.
Intermediation Quality
Our approach to devise a measure of intermediation quality is inspired by Lucchetti et al. (2001) and Berger et al. (2004) . We approximate the quality of banks to perform their intermediation function by the eciency of banks to employ resources when generating nancial products and services.
The intuition behind this proxy unfolds as follows. We regard the main task of a bank to channel funds from savers to investors, to allocate them to the most protable projects and to act as a delegated monitor after investment. Therefore, we consider in line with Sealey and Lindley (1977) the monetary volume intermediated as output O. When conducting their intermediation function, we assume that banks minimize cost, C. This requires them to use input quantities, Q, such as labor and deposits, in optimal proportions to produce a portfolio of outputs, for example interbank versus corporate loans. Under the assumption that banks are price-takers in factor markets, optimal input proportions depend on relative input prices, P . Bank ineciency arises when managers employ simply too much input quantities and/or allocate them in wrong proportions.
Let us illustrate the link between eciency and the quality of nancial services provided with an example. If banks are better developed, we would expect that they hire the optimal amount of risk managers and credit ocers given their choice of a loan portfolio to supply and respective wages. Assume that a bank granted relatively many corporate loans, which we assume to be on average more risky compared to interbank loans. Consider now a management that hires too few (or not appropriately trained) credit ocers to monitor these exposures and also too few risk managers to price the loan during the negotiations prior to lending appropriately. This may save the bank labor costs in the short run. But if the bank consistently 16 If explanatory variables are correlated with past and contemporaneous errors E[X i,t , i,s ] = 0 for s ≤ t, we refer to the variable as endogenous. Then, using rst dierences requires us to use levels lagged by two periods or more as instruments. In contrast, predetermined variables are contemporaneously uncorrelated with the errors E[X i,t , i,s ] = 0 for s < t and present realizations depend only on past shocks. Thus, is suces to instrument predetermined variables with their levels lagged by one period.
17 Note, however, that this tests cannot rule out the conceptual question of reverse causality. Ultimately, the decision to specify GDP to depend on nancial development can only be rooted in theory.
underprices riskier loans, subsequent defaults will result in write-os of bad loans, thereby increasing cost and ultimately leading to ineciency.
18 As a second example, banks may simply employ too much of an input. Spending on buildings and other xed assets may be too high if managers negotiate rents poorly or if they are more interested in prestigious oces. Such a bank is then identied as inecient compared to the industry. 19 We estimate cost eciency with stochastic frontier analysis. A bank produces three outputs: interbank and commercial loans, O 1 and O 2 , respectively, and securities, O 3 . To this end, it demands three inputs subject to given prices, P , and the technology constraint, T (O, Q, Z), which also contains equity, Z. A bank employs xed assets, Q 1 , labor, Q 2 , and borrowed funds, Q 3 . We account for technological change with a time trend t (Baltagi and Grin, 1988) . We specify the cost frontier using the translog functional form and write the reduced form as:
In any year t, a bank k can deviate from optimal cost due to random noise, v kt , or inecient use of in-and outputs, u kt . To distinguish these two eects, we specify a composed total error, ε kt . For a cost frontier, ineciency leads to above frontier costs. Therefore, the total error is ε kt = u kt + v kt . The random error term v kt is assumed iid with v kt ∼ N (0, σ 2 v ) and independent of the explanatory variables. The ineciency term is iid with u kt ∼ N |(0, σ 2 u )| and independent of the v kt . It is drawn from a non-negative distribution truncated at zero.
21
In contrast to Lucchetti et al. (2001) and Berger et al. (2004) , we follow Greene (2005) and use a bank-specic xed eects stochastic frontier model with timevariant ineciency to estimate the parameters in equation (10). This is important because Bos et al. (2005) show that systematic dierences across banks that are not due to ineciency must be accounted for in eciency analyses. Such systematic dierences are likely to exist even within one economy only, let alone in cross-country studies like that of Berger et al. (2004) .
Non-random dierences of banks' costs that are not due to ineciency are here captured by the bank-specic xed eect, α k .
22 Subsequently, we obtain bankspecic eciency measures with the method suggested by Jondrow et al. (1982) . We use the conditional distribution of u given ε and a point estimator of technical eciency is given by E(u k |ε k ), i.e. the mean of u k given ε k . Cost eciency (F D Q ) is calculated as [exp(−u kt )] and equals one for a fully ecient bank. Likewise, F D Q of 0.9 implies that a bank could have produced an identical output vector with 90 percent of actually incurred cost.
We argue that our F D Q measure enjoys three major advantages compared to the traditional approaches in the nance-growth literature. First, it is a much more direct measure of resources wasted during the intermediation process due to suboptimal allocation and use of input factors in the vein of Leibenstein (1966) . It therefore resembles the η component of nancial development mentioned in Pagano (1993) much closer compared to the intermediated credit volume employed traditionally.
Second, we estimate a long-run cost frontier, which covers operational costs inclusive of those costs arising from writing o non-performing loans. Deviations from optimal costs therefore capture the long-run (dis-)ability of bankers to full their intermediation task eciently. We argue that this holistic assessment of bank performance captures the ability to gather information both ex ante and ex post more appropriately compared to a proxy of the volume intermediated. This is because systematic and sustained failure to optimize the production process in light of these core functions of successful bankers, will result in higher than industry cost. Hence, we think that our F D Q measure also captures the inuence of nancial development on A to a better extent compared to the sheer size of the nancial industry.
Third, the relative ability to convert inputs into outputs is less prone to critique regarding reverse causality. In section 3.1 we pointed out that cross-sectional estimation fails to distinguish whether large volumes of bank credit, that is bank size, cause economic growth or rather result from it. While the use of instruments in our dynamic panel model alleviates the problem, F D Q enjoys the conceptual advantage that it is a reltive measure. More specically, we assume that the transformation technology T (·) is identical for all banks operating in Germany. At the same time, we account simultaneously through α k for systematic dierences across banks, such as size or banking sector. Our quality proxy of nancial development, F D Q , is therefore independent of the credit volume of an individual bank because the eciency of a bank does not depend on how much output it produces but rather how well it does so. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the sustained ability of individual banks to exploit its resources given the available technology as ecient as possible does not depend per se on whether the economy is contracting or expanding. Intuitively, the performance of bankers to minimize costs when supplying nancial services should foster growth independent of the question whether the intermediated volume is small or large.
As noted earlier in our growth specication, the Arellano-Bond estimator allows 22 The α k 's are allowed to be correlated with O kt , W kt and Z kt (Greene, 2005) . us to test the validity of our empirical specication in the light of the potential endogeneity of the nancial development indicators more formally below. Before turning to our results, we briey discuss our data sources and dened variables.
Data and Variables
qrowth Macroeconomic data per district (4ureis4) are obtained from State and Federal Statistical Oces, respectively. 23 These data are available on an annual basis between 1994 and 2003. The Federal Oce for Building and Regional Planning (4fundeseh ¤ örde für fuwesen und umordnung4) provided us with a key to map these political regions, namely districts, to economic planning regions (4umE ordnungsregionenD y4) in Germany. The latter consist of multiple districts and represent the oce's taxonomy. It is based on economic interdependencies as approximated by commuters within economic agglomeration areas.
24 Niebuhr (2001) argues that the use of economic planing regions is signicantly superior due to their denition by economic criteria compared to political regions provided by the statistical oces. 25 Our data comprise all 97 ROR in Germany and we use GDP per worker, Y , as dependent variable. 26 pinnil development We use balance sheet and prot and loss account data for all private and public banks that reported to the Bundesbank between 1993 and 2004. As noted earlier, we measure the quantity of nancial development F D V as the amount of loans and securities over GDP. The quality of nancial intermediation F D Q is approximated by cost eciency, measured with stochastic frontier analysis. After estimating F D Q for each bank in every year, we allocate bank-specic variables to their respective ROR via the location of the head oce of the bank. Given the de jure principle of regional demarcation of German public banks as well as the de fto regionally limited range of activity of small commercial and virtually all cooperative banks, bank specic indicators should accurately describe both quality and quantity of nancial intermediation within a respective ROR. We conduct two plausibility checks regarding the defensibility of this approach. First, we use data on the large credit register of the Bundesbank (4willionenkreditevidenz4) to obtain the percentage share of loans larger than 1.5 million Euros granted within the regions (4yrtsnummer4) classied by the Bundesbank. While not identical to ROR this classication provides the closest alternative. 27 On average, local savings and cooperative banks grant 80 percent of their loan portfolio to customers within the Bundesbank regions. Even for commercial banks the local lending share is still at around 30 percent. This supports our approach to allocate banks on the basis of their head quarters. As a second check we use available information on bank branches to 23 These regions resemble the NUTS 3 level of the data assembled by Eurostat. 24 We also employed data on the district and state level to check our estimations for robustness. While results are qualitatively similar, we consider our choice of RORs superior to other regions in order to minimize spatial correlations and poor asymptotic properties of our estimator for small cross-sections. 25 An alternative regional dimension to analyze growth in Germany are labor market regions as in Kosfeld et al. (2005) and German Council of Economic Advisors (2004) . 26 Alternatively, we checked the robustness of our results using gross value added per worker. Furthermore, we also checked dependent variables per capita. 27 German banks have to report each loan beyond the mentioned size to the Bundesbank indicating the debtor and his geographical location. examine the regional activities of banks. Only very few banks maintain networks in more than one ROR. In fact, the branch network of savings and cooperative banks is highly concentrated within their respective ROR. While 93 percent of all cooperative banks' branches are located within the ROR of the head oce, the branch network of saving banks is even more concentrated with 97 percent of all branches located within the same ROR. Despite these supporting indications we still consider national banks undertaking their business across ROR to present a diculty since a precise allocation of their activities remains impractical. This is also conrmed by the branch distribution of nationally active banks. The share of branches within the same ROR of large commercial banks, small commercial banks and vndesnken is 5, 31 and 45 percent, respectively. Therefore, we estimate below our preferred specication also after excluding all nationally active banks. 28 gontrols To control for the accumulation of human capital, HC, we use the ratio of student enrollment in the upper secondary school relative to total students. As in King and Levine (1993) we consider capital depreciation δ to be constant at 5 percent and we specify population growth as the change of the employed population. We dene the joint variable as ET G in our estimated regressions. 29 Finally, we amend control variables for the structure of local banking markets. In our results section we present estimations that use either the mean market share per ROR or the local Hirschman-Herndahl-Index as proxies for competition. Variable descriptions, sources and summary statistics are depicted in table 5 in the appendix.
4 Results pei(tion ghoies We consider two specication choices most important when estimating the growth model as presented in equation (7). First, we need to investigate if our quality and quantity measures of nancial development should be specied as exogenous, predetermined or endogenous variables. Clearly, the dierentiation of a variable as endogenous or predetermined should be model driven. The approach pursued here is to let the Sargan test validate whether the imposed moment conditions determined by the choice of instruments are systematically violated when our measures of nancial development are specied as endogenous, predetermined or exogenous.
30 Second, we are concerned with potential problems due to serial correlation and an adequate lag-structure of level variables used as instruments for our lagged endogenous variable y i,t−1 .
Consider rst the Sargan test, which provides a mean to test the appropriateness of specied instruments for the lagged dependent and especially nancial development indicators (Arellano and Bond (1991) ). If it is true that nancial development merely results from an increased demand for nancial funds in an expanding economy, the specication of F D V and/or F D Q as exogenous variables yields biased and inconsistent estimates due to their contemporaneous correlation with the error term. 28 These are large commercial banks, Landesbanken and central cooperative banks. 29 In analogy to the specication of GDP per capita we also employed population growth here as well. We also checked the robustness of our results for alternative values for δ, ranging in increments of 50 basis points between 2.5 to 7.5 percent. By and large, results were not qualitatively aected. 30 See footnote 16 for the choice of instruments for predetermined and endogenous variables. This would be indicated by the Sargan test since equation (9) is no longer fullled. We may treat nancial development alternatively as predetermined or endogenous variables which implies the use of alternative lagged levels instruments. If such as specication fullls the notion that the expected correlation between contemporaneous errors and instruments is not systematically dierent from zero, we interpret the eect of nancial development due to its direct eect on growth. In the predetermined case, an acceptance of the H 0 under the Sargan test indicates that nancial development is at least contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term.
We therefore estimate the baseline model in equation (7) using the two-step GMM estimator. 31 Consider the nine respective Sargan test statistics in table 1 that represent all possible combinations as how to specify the quality and the quantity of nancial intermediation, respectively. 32 In the upper panel of table 1 we depict the three possible specication choices of F D V in columns and the respective options for F D Q in rows.
In the upper left cell of table 1 we depict the case to simultaneously specify 31 In terms of table 5 the employed variables are:
, HC and ET G. 32 Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the one-step Sargan test over-rejects in the presence of heteroscedasticity and therefore formulate a consistent two-step estimator. However, Arellano and Bond (1991) also note that standard errors of individual coecients from the two-step estimator suer from a downward bias. Therefore, we focus here only on test statistics based on the two-step estimator as these are suited for specication choices. We report coecients subsequently on the basis of one-step estimates to draw inference. both indicators of nancial development as exogenous variables. The according Sargan statistic rejects this specications on the basis of a systematic violation of the moment conditions. This specication indicates that nancial development is not independent of growth.
Regarding the remaining options as how to specify these indicators, our results indicate across the whole range, that at least one of the two variables needs to be instrumented. Notably, it is statistically irrelevant which of the two is chosen. Also note that it is statistically permissable to specify one or both indicators either as predetermined or as endogenous variable. For any combination, the Sargan test is insignicant and does not reject the set of instruments chosen.
Our prime conclusion regarding this result is to acknowledge that the use of estimators using suitable instruments is necessary. Inference from analyses that fail to instrument nancial development indicators of either kind must be treated with great care.
33
Another conclusion of this result is that econometric guidance alone does not provide a clear-cut picture. We therefore motivate our specication choice based on our view that the relative nature of our F D Q measure supports the notion of strict exogeneity. In contrast, on grounds of potentially higher demand for nancial funds as a consequence of higher growth, we regard the F D V eect of nancial development at least as predetermined. Henceforth, reported results therefore instrument F D V as a predetermined and include F D Q as exogenous variable.
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To ease, however, a comparison to the most frequently encountered approaches in the literature consider table 2. We present coecient estimates for two estimations. In the rst column we specify both F D V and F D Q as exogenous variables, the second depicts our preferred baseline specication where only the former is instrumented. The results indicate that our measure of the quality of nancial development is not aected by choosing to instrument both proxies as predetermined variables.
35
Second, we consider briey the issue of serial correlation. As discussed in section 3.1, taking rst dierences and rewriting equation (7) implies that the error term ∆ t suers from serial correlation by construction, which is unproblematic given our dierence estimator.
36 However, we must not observe any autocorrelation of higher order as to avoid inconsistent and biased estimates. For all possible combinations of F D Q and F D V discussed above, the bottom panel in table 1 reports according test statistics and p-values. The results provide evidence that second-order autocorrelation does not present a problem. rile ghoie We consider next alternative dependent variables y and addi- 33 We also estimated the growth specication with alternative estimators, ranging from simple cross-sectional and pooled OLS to xed eect panel estimators. These robustness checks further underpinned our conclusion that dynamic panel estimators using appropriate instruments are key to the analysis. 34 We checked subsequent regressions systematically across all nine specication choices depicted in table 1. Bearing the well-known sensitivity of instrumental GMM for dynamic panels in mind, our results were surprisingly robust. 35 We refrain at this stage from interpreting single coecients in more depth since we concentrate rst on our specication choices. Instead, we ask the reader to bear with us for a few more pages until we discuss individual estimates.
36 This is conrmed by tests for an AR(1) process which we do not report here. -1.47 -1.56 Robust standard errors in brackets ***, **, * denotes signicance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
tional control variables x in the baseline regression. Table 3 presents results based on the one-step AB estimator with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Column (1) contains the baseline regression using GDP per worker as dependent variable. In line with our expectations, the coecient of F D Q is signicant and positive. An improvement of 1 percent of the quality of nancial intermediation furthers economic growth by about 0.09 percent. With regard to F D V we nd that the coecient is insignicant and negative. This stands in contrast to the evidence presented in the nance-growth literature. The result suggests that merely increasing the amount of bank loans has no signicant impact on growth. Potentially, the amount of funds provided by banks to nance investment projects is not in short supply. Then, increasing the volume of potentially available funds for investment exerts per se no growth impetus. 37 In contrast, an improvement of the ability to put these available funds to use in the sense of selecting and monitoring investment projects indeed helps to promote growth.
With regard to the control variables, we nd that human capital (HC) and the growth of the working population (ET G) exhibit signs in line with expectations and are statistically signicant. The former exhibits a positive coecient, which implies that faster accumulation of know-how feeds economic growth. The latter yields the result that higher population growth leads, etF prF, to reduced income per capita. The result for human capital is in line with previous ndings in the literature. However, Kosfeld et al. (2005) fail to detect any eect with regard to the The results remain qualitatively similar for alternative variables. Column (2) is based on the same regression using gross value added per worker as dependent variable. The coecients remain largely unchanged while we reject the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation at the 10 percent level. Thus, the results based on gross value added per worker are potentially biased and inconsistent. In column (3) and (4) of table 3 we add further variables about the structure of local banking markets. Column (3) contains the Herndahl-Hirschman index on the basis of total assets per ROR. The regression in column (4) includes the average market share of banks per ROR. Both measures are proxies for market power. The coecients for both proxies are insignicant and have no eect on our result for nancial development.
egionl versus ntionl nks Next, we analyze if the identied quality eect of nancial development is driven by a potential failure to appropriately allocate the activities of national banks to separate regions. While the majority of German banks are small and undertake their business within a limited geographical area, some operate on a nation-wide basis (Koetter et al., 2004) .
Local banks comprise primarily savings and cooperative banks but also smaller 38 We also run regressions using the growth of the total population and also found a signicant and negative impact on growth. commercial banks. To account for the unavailability of regional income distributions of nationally active banks, we therefore exclude this group when constructing our indicators for nancial development. The respective results in column (1) Sargan tests from AB Two-Step Estimation. ***, **, * denotes signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Note that specication (1) still incorporates small commercial banks. One may object the assumption that the business of small commercial banks is limited to a geographical area similar to that of public and private banks from the cooperative sector. Since there is no possibility to verify the geographical scope of activity for the group of small commercial banks, we further reduce our sample to construct nancial development indicators.
Consider to this end column (2), where we estimate our baseline specication with measures of nancial development that are derived for public and cooperative banks only. Because both groups are active in all ROR in all years, we test for asymmetries by including our F D Q and F D V variables for each pillar separately. While we still nd that the coecient of F D Q is positive for both banking groups, it is, however, only statistically discernable from zero for the group of cooperative banks.
One potential explanation is that a change in the eciency of savings banks has no signicant growth impact due to an already higher level compared to other banks. However, our summary statistics for cost eciency per region indicate no such dierences in the data. 40 Therefore, we are more inclined to hypothesize that it may well be possible that the role of savings banks, or more precisely the relation between their eciency and local growth, is simply too dierent in the regions of Germany to yield a common coecient on F D Q in table 4 that is statistically signicant for the whole of the economy. 41 Note, however, that sttistil signicance need not preclude eoE nomi signicance. Perhaps, the role of public banks is particularly important in less well endowed regions while it is markedly less relevant for growth in already better developed regions of the German economy. This is supported by a test on the equality of the coecients for eciency of both pillars which we cannot reject. It is thus possible that savings banks eciency have a similar impact on local growth.
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While we cannot accept such a hypothesis on the basis of our analysis, such a result would be fairly in line with earlier studies distinguishing between developed and less-developed countries on the one hand and private and public banks on the other (Rioja and Valev, 2004; Galindo and Micco, 2004) . In our view, therefore, the role of public banks in general and the apparent heterogeneity in German banking requires further research.
Finally we note that the systematic dierence of F D Q for these two banking groups is conrmed in columns (3) and (4). We estimate for each pillar separately and the result for cooperative banks implies that a sheer expansion of nancial quantity of cooperative banks is to the detriment of income per worker. 43 Clearly, we do not model here whether the volume of cooperative bank loans is supply or demand driven. But what we infer from our results is that larger volumes do not promote growth. Instead, an improvement in the quality of nancial intermediation is the variable that indicates a positive eect on income per worker. 40 Mean eciency for both banking groups is around 74 % and the standard deviation of eciency for savings banks even exceeds that of cooperative banks. 41 We check to this end for each ROR the correlation between Y and F D Q of savings and cooperative banks, respectively. While mean correlations are virtually identical, the standard deviation of correlations for savings is indeed 50 percent larger compared to that of cooperative banks. 42 In fact, estimating two regionally separated models (East versus West and regions above versus below median GDP per worker in 1993) yields that savings bank eciency in poorer regions is indeed signicant. While those estimates are available upon request from the authors, we do not depict them here since specication tests do not allow us to draw statistically rm inference. 43 As in the case of F D Q , the coecient for savings banks points into the same direction but is statistically insignicant.
Conclusion
We provide in this paper evidence on the nance-growth nexus for the regions of Germany. Using data for the 97 economic planning regions (4umordnungsregioE nenD y4) and all banks operating in the Republic, we distinguish two dierent channels of nancial development: a Hicksian volume eect F D V and a quality effect F D Q of nancial development in the vein of Schumpeter. We introduce an improved measure for the latter: microeconomic cost eciency measured for each bank individually. Our main results are the following ve.
First, our evidence supports the notion that the quality of nancial intermediation as measured by cost eciency of individual banks signicantly aects growth. A one-percent increase in cost eciency spurs GDP per worker by 0.09 percent.
Second, the traditional proxy of credit volume to GDP used in most nancegrowth studies receives no statistical support for our sample. In most specications, an expanding amount of bank credit has no signicant eect on growth.
Third, we nd evidence that both measures of nancial development must not be specied simultaneously as exogenous explanatory variable. We nd that the use of instrumental variable estimators is necessary. However, by choosing suitable instruments we are able to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates.
Fourth, our results remain robust after excluding those banks from the construction of our nancial development indicator that operate nationally and can therefore not be allocated to single regions with complete certainty. Nonetheless, after including F D Q and F D V only for local banks from each pillar, it is only the former eect of nancial development that aects growth signicantly and positively.
Fifth, both the quality and quantity eect is signicant for cooperative banks only. In general, the results lead us to conclude that it is not the volume of funds, which is in short supply in Germany's region. In fact, the positive eect of F D Q on growth suggests that economic expansion requires better but not necessarily more banking.
Two important caveats deserve mention. First, the negative and mostly insignificant coecient found for lending volume may merely reect the maturity of the German economy and could actually indicate an excess supply of credit (German Council of Economic Advisors, 2004) . However, such inference would require the explicit modelling of the credit market as to determine if the observed level of aggregate loans indeed reects the equilibrium level or not. Second, the lack of statistical significance of savings banks' eciency need not imply economic insignicance. Rather, it may merely reect the need to account more explicitly for potentially alternative roles played by these banks in dierent stages of economic development across regions at a given point in time.
Here, we remain in line with the existing nance growth literature and deem both issues out of the present paper's scope. But our results indicate that, rst, the channels of nancial development are conceptually dierent and, second, this dierence can be taken into account by using eciency as a more explicit proxy for the quality eects nancial development has on growth.
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